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Freedom of Association, Extreme Partisan 
Gerrymandering, Justiciability and the Unmistakable 
Political Question Controversy 
L. Darnell Weeden 
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The issue to be addressed is whether partisan gerrymandering is a 
political question not capable of judicial resolution by federal courts, 
or whether partisan gerrymandering is instead a politicized issue that 
justices on the Court intentionally do not want to address at this time 
because they want to remain politicized while not appearing to be a 
politicized Supreme Court. The Court on June 27, 2019, in a 5-4 de-
cision, held that partisan gerrymandering allegations are political is-
sues that federal courts should not consider.1 By now, it should be com-
mon knowledge that all of the justices who voted to accept the view 
that partisan gerrymandering is a political question were appointed by 
a Republican president, while all of the justices who voted to hear the 
partisan gerrymandering issue on the merits were appointed by a pres-
ident who identified as a Democrat. 
I reject the Court’s analysis and conclusion that partisan gerryman-
dering is a political question, and argue that the Court is obligated to 
resolve partisan First Amendment gerrymandering issues to redress 
the injuries suffered by plaintiffs. The Supreme Court should address 
partisan gerrymandering issues on the merits. The effort by a group of 
California Democrats in proposing legislation requiring congressional 
districts to be redrawn by independent redistricting commissions on 
 
 *  Associate Dean of Faculty Development & Research Professor of Law Roberson King 
Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University; B.A., J.D., University 
of Mississippi. I am thankful to my wife and my children for their tolerance while I produced this 
article. I would like to recognize my research assistant, Bernardo Villarreal Aguirre, Juris Doc-
torate candidate 2020, for his valuable research help. I would also like to thank the members of 
BYU Journal of Public Law for their very helpful suggestions during the publishing of my article.  
 1.  Jacqueline Thomsen, California Democrats Unveil Redistricting Reform Bill After 
Supreme Court Partisan Gerrymandering Ruling, THE HILL (June 28, 2019 1:03 PM), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/450903-california-democrats-unveil-redistricting-reform-
bill-after-supreme-court. 
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June 28, 2019, the day after the Supreme Court held that courts lack 
the ability to judge partisan gerrymandering allegations,2 is a step in 
the right direction because of the belief that the commissions will take 
every reasonable effort to avoid partisan gerrymandering. The pro-
posed federal legislation requires each state to create independent 
commissions and it gives the duty of creating legislative boundaries for 
congressional districting to those commissions.3 House Rules Com-
mittee Chairwoman Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) said, “If the U.S. Supreme 
Court won't fight to protect Americans' votes, then Congress will.”4 
Lofgren also declared, “Our democracy cannot function properly un-
less every person's vote counts equally, and voters choose their elected 
officials, not the other way around. My bill would fix our broken re-
districting process to ensure all voices are heard and politicians are held 
accountable.”5 Under the proposed federal law the commissions and 
not the state legislature create the boundaries for each congressional 
district.6 The proposed independent commission legislation is not new 
because virtually identical legislation was approved by the House in 
2019.7 
The legislative fate of the federal independent commission pro-
posal is currently very problematic. “However, Senate Majority Leader 
Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) has said that he won't bring it up for a vote 
on the Senate floor.”8 Perhaps the Republican Senator McConnell 
does not want to take steps to do away with partisan gerrymandering 
because of a demonstrated partisan advantage for Republicans.9 “In the 
drawing of lines for hundreds of U.S. and state legislative seats . . . ac-
cording to an Associated Press (AP) analysis: Republicans had a real 
advantage.”10 The AP study included 435 U.S. races as well as approx-
imately 4,700 state legislative seats during the 2016 election cycle to 
 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See Associated Press, Analysis: Partisan Gerrymandering Has Benefited Republicans 
More than Democrats, BUS. INSIDER (June 25, 2017, 12:25 PM), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/partisan-gerrymandering-has-benefited-republicans-more-than-democrats-
2017-6. 
   10.  Id. 
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determine whether partisan gerrymandering typically delivered more 
benefits to Republicans or Democrats.11 The study identified the Re-
publican Party as the party that benefited most from partisan gerry-
mandering.12 “The analysis found four times as many states with Re-
publican-skewed state House or Assembly districts than Democratic 
ones. Among the two dozen most populated states that determine the 
vast majority of Congress, there were nearly three times as many with 
Republican-tilted U.S. House districts.”13 In the highly contested po-
litical frontlines of Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Wiscon-
sin, Florida, and Virginia, the Republicans maintain a partisan gerry-
mandering redistricting benefit. All of those long-established 
battleground states had their congressional legislative districts de-
signed by Republicans after the last census in 2010.14 In addition, the 
AP analysis determined “that Republicans won as many as 22 addi-
tional U.S. House seats over what would have been expected based on 
the average vote share in congressional districts across the country. 
That helped provide the GOP with a comfortable majority over Dem-
ocrats instead of a narrow one.”15 The AP study is consistent with a 
study conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York 
University School of Law during the 2012-2016 congressional election 
cycles.16 The Brennan Center also found Republicans benefited more 
from partisan gerrymandering than Democrats and concluded there 
was “clear evidence that aggressive gerrymandering is distorting the 
nation's congressional maps,” presenting a “threat to democracy.”17 
 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id.; see also Michael Li, Extreme Maps, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 
(May 9, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/extreme-maps (“Us-
ing data from the 2012, 2014, and 2016 election cycles, Extreme Maps finds that partisan bias 
resulting largely from the worst gerrymandering abuses in just a few battleground states provides 
Republicans a durable advantage of 16-17 seats in the current Congress, representing a significant 
portion of the 24 seats Democrats would need to gain control of the House in 2020. These ‘ex-
treme maps’ were all drawn in states under single-party control; the report finds that conversely, 
maps drawn by independent commissions, courts, or split-party state governments had signifi-
cantly less partisan bias in their maps.”). 
 17.  Id.; see also Associated Press, Partisan gerrymandering benefited Republicans in 2016 
election – report, THE GUARDIAN (June 25, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/jun/ 25/partisan-gerrymandering-republicans-2016-report (“A separate statistical 
analysis conducted for the AP by the Princeton University Gerrymandering Project found that the 
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Since political context matters, the issue of partisan gerrymander-
ing cries out for federal judicial relief from the Court. The partisan 
gerrymandering issue will perhaps reappear before the Court as soon 
as Republicans believe that extreme partisan gerrymander produces a 
concrete injury to Republicans rather than an advantage. In the near 
future, an inconsistent conservative majority on a politicized Supreme 
Court could reach the right conclusion for the wrong reason by decid-
ing that partisan gerrymandering is no longer a political question in-
capable of judicial resolution when the evidence demonstrates a per-
sistent pattern of an advantage for Democrats utilizing partisan 
gerrymanders. Judicial prudence demands that a truly impartial and 
independent Court will follow the examples of lower courts and com-
mentators and hear the merits of partisan gerrymandering claims. As 
soon as the Court is ready to do so, it may address those constitutional 
allegations on the merits and reverse the position that partisan gerry-
mandering presents a political question. This article implies that the 
Supreme Court’s holding that partisan gerrymandering is a political 
question creates a plausible argument that a majority of the justices 
may have become politicized on the partisan gerrymandering issue. 
Part I briefly discusses the partisan burdens placed on the freedom 
of association prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rucho v. Com-
mon Cause.18 Part II presents a historical judicial treatment of partisan 
gerrymandering. Part III contends a statewide right of political associ-
ation injury in a “district-specific, extreme partisan” gerrymandering 
case is justiciable because judicially discernable and manageable stand-
ards exist to redress the plaintiff's allegation that she has suffered a 
concrete harm because of the associational burdens created by partisan 
gerrymandering. Part III also reminds us that it is important to 
acknowledge that the lower federal courts’ judgments discovering 
standing in partisan gerrymandering cases establish that these partisan 
 
extreme Republican advantages in some states were no fluke. The Republican edge in Michigan’s 
state House districts had only a 1-in-16,000 probability of occurring by chance; in Wisconsin’s As-
sembly districts, there was a mere 1-in-60,000 likelihood of it happening randomly, the analysis found. 
The AP’s findings are similar to recent ones from the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York 
University School of Law, which used three statistical tests to analyze the 2012-2016 congressional 
elections. Its report found a persistent Republican advantage and ‘clear evidence that aggressive ger-
rymandering is distorting the nation’s congressional maps’, posing a ‘threat to democracy’. The Bren-
nan Center did not analyze state legislative elections. The AP’s analysis was based on a formula de-
veloped by University of Chicago law professor Nick Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee, a researcher 
at the nonpartisan Public Policy Institute of California.”). 
 18.  See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
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gerrymandering cases should not be considered political question is-
sues because the lower federal courts are quite capable of resolving 
partisan gerrymander issues under a First Amendment freedom of as-
sociation analysis. In Part IV, an analysis of the extreme partisan ger-
rymandering issue in Gill v. Whitford indicates that it is unnecessary 
to treat partisan gerrymandering as a political question. In Part V, the 
post-Gill v. Whitford lower court partisan gerrymandering cases 
demonstrate how to judicially apply discernable and manageable 
standards to redress a partisan gerrymandering issue without violating 
the political question doctrine. In Part VI, the article proclaims the 
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Rucho v. Common Cause, that parti-
san gerrymandering allegations are nonjusticiable political questions 
not capable of federal judicial resolution, is so flawed the Supreme 
Court should reconsider this question as soon as possible. Part VI sup-
ports the view asserted by Justice Kagan in her powerful dissent in 
Rucho19 that for the first time in its history, the Supreme Court has 
declined to provide relief for a constitutional infringement because it 
considers the duty outside the scope of judicial expertise. Part VI ar-
gues that the refusal to grant judicial relief from partisan gerryman-
dering creates the plausible appearance that some of the justices may 
be too politicized to exercise their judicial expertise to provide relief 
for a constitutional violation alleging partisan gerrymandering because 
partisan gerrymandering currently benefits the Republican Party. The 
conclusion in Part VII rejects the Supreme Court’s Court big-picture 
claim that partisan gerrymandering should be treated as a political 
question because partisan gerrymandering cannot be politically neutral 
or manageable.20 The Supreme Court's political question rationale 
should be rejected because the lower courts, with a rationale that is 
superior to the Supreme Court’s rationale in logic if not in law, have 
developed standards that allow for neutral and manageable oversight 







 19.  Id. at 2516 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id. 
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The Supreme Court’s June 27, 2019, rather surprising refusal to 
render a decision on the merits in a partisan gerrymandering case in 
Rucho v. Common Cause based on the belief that partisan gerryman-
dering presents a political question the Supreme Court cannot resolve, 
is misguided.22 States have used the gerrymandering process to adopt 
extremely partisan redistricting plans.23 Minority party voters may be 
“cracked” by the process of dividing a party's followers into multiple 
legislative districts so that they fail to reach an electoral majority in an 
election in any of the districts.24 Sometimes minority party voters are 
also described as being “packed” in a gerrymandering process which 
overpopulates the minority party’s voters inside a small number of dis-
tricts where the minority party candidates are likely to win with large 
majorities. Packing typically has the practical effect of assuring that a 
minority party candidate's significant voting majority fails to signifi-
cantly increase legislative seats for representatives of the minority 
party.25 Packing undermines representative democracy because not-
withstanding minority party candidates receiving significantly larger 
statewide voter support than the majority party, the number of minor-
ity party representatives to actually serve in the legislature fails to rea-
sonably correlate with the collective associational ballots cast to sup-
port the views of minority party candidates statewide.26 
 
 22.  See generally Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484. 
 23.  See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and 
the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 831, 834, 849-50 (2015).  
 24.  Id. 
 25.  See Michael Li, Thomas Wolf & Annie Lo, The State of Redistricting Litigation 
(October 14, 2019), BRENNAN CENTER (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.brennan-
center.org/blog/state-redistricting-litigation (last visited July 15, 2019). 
 26.  See Stephanopoulos, supra note 23, at 836-837 ("In the current cycle, for example, 
the Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia congressional plans have gaps of at least two seats 
that are unlikely to dissipate given plausible changes in voters' preferences. Likewise, the Idaho, 
Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode 
Island, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming state house plans have gaps of at least 8 percent that 
also are unlikely to fade away in future elections."); see also Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 
837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016) vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
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Opponents of extreme partisan gerrymandering have attacked the 
issue of the excessive partisan gerrymandering process with an effi-
ciency gap theory because the efficiency gap shows how the associa-
tional value of a vote is wasted.27 Proponents of the efficiency gap the-
ory contend that regardless of whether a minority party voter actually 
lives in a district that was packed or cracked, the minority party has 
been injured statewide as a result of the political exploitation of district 
boundaries because minority party voters’ statewide expressive free-
dom of association is infringed upon.28 A voter suffers a concrete 
statewide injury when the minority party’s larger expressive associa-
tional voting voice is granted lesser actual representative power in the 
state legislature, while the majority party who won a lesser amount of 
the cast ballots statewide is rewarded with greater representative 
power. The majority party’s greater legislative representation visits a 
statewide injury on the minority party voters because their collective 
voting majority is not reflected in the partisan makeup of the state leg-
islature. Excessive partisan redistricting distorts the collective associa-
tional representational rights of the legislatively underrepresented mi-
nority party.29 The potential power of packing and cracking “can be 
measured by a single calculation: an ‘efficiency gap’ that compares each 
party’s respective ‘wasted’ votes across all legislative districts. ‘Wasted’ 
votes are those cast for a losing candidate or for a winning candidate 
in excess of what that candidate needs to win.”30 Under an expanded 
version of the efficiency gap theory, when partisan voting statewide 
produces a large majority voting preference for the minority party and 
the minority party remains the minority party, an associational injury 
occurs.31 An association injury exists because the partisan majority 
votes cast are wasted, producing a collective statewide injury given that 
the state legislature is very likely to produce partisan laws that apply 
statewide and are not restricted to a specific legislative district.32 
The author believes scholars, legal analysts, and litigators, unlike 
the Supreme Court, actually accepted Justice Kagan’s challenge in her 
concurring opinion in Gill v. Whitford.33 Justice Kagan challenged the 
 
 27.  Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1924 (2018). 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 1924-26. 
 32.  Id. at 1924. 
 33.  Id. at 1934. 
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plaintiffs on remand to offer the court more than a vote dilution theory 
for an individual voter in a partisan redistricting gerrymandering case 
and to also develop the freedom of association right to support a 
statewide collective injury under the First Amendment. According to 
Justice Kagan, partisan gerrymandering not only unmistakably bur-
dens individual voters, but also causes harm of a different type by in-
fringing on voters’ First Amendment right to the freedom associa-
tion.34 
There are good reasons supporting the development of the right 
to the freedom of association in an excessively partisan gerrymander-
ing litigation. Under a First Amendment Freedom of Association anal-
ysis, plaintiffs presenting the challenge in excessive partisan gerryman-
dering cases should not be required to prove that their particular 
voting district was packed or cracked in support of their statewide in-
jury-in-fact standing claim.35 The packing or cracking of a district has 
no appropriate link to their substantive associational injury-in-fact 
claim to a collective entitlement to a representative number of seats in 
the legislature based on the number of partisan votes cast by the voters 
statewide.36 Without any hesitation, Justice Kagan correctly asserts 
that the Court should consider everything about the right to freedom 
of association in a partisan gerrymandering challenge from standing 
on down to remedy.37 It is my contention that if extreme partisan re-
districting plan cause voters in the state to lose seats in the legislature, 
those voters have suffered enough state wide partisan harm to support 
Article III standing.38 
The freedom of association was first officially recognized in 
NAACP v. Alabama, a 1958 case, as a fundamental right subject to 
strict scrutiny, which means the government must demonstrate that an 
efficiency gap cracking or packing regulation is required to serve a 
compelling justification and must be accomplished by least restrictive 
means.39 The Court reasoned that freedom of association is an insepa-
rable aspect of the liberty assured by the Due Process Clause of the 
 
 34.  Id. at 1934, 1938-39. 
 35.  Id. at 1938-39. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 1938-40. 
 38.  Contra id. at 1916, 1931. 
 39.  See Charles E. Rice, The Constitutional Right of Association, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 491, 
491-492 (1965) ("It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement 
of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of 
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Fourteenth Amendment.40 After NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme 
Court's decisions referred to constitutionally-protected ‘freedom of 
association’ in two distinct senses: as embracing (1) the choice “to enter 
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships”41 as safe-
guarding one’s personal liberty, and (2) “a right to associate for the 
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amend-
ment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the 
exercise of religion.”42 The Supreme Court said the right of association 
included “political assemblies . . . , social and legal, and economic ben-
efit’ of citizens.”43 Recognizing a fundamental right in the freedom of 
association pertaining to political, social, legal, and economic matters, 
the Supreme Court further developed the idea of a fundamental right 
of association in relation to voting by holding that “the right of indi-
viduals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the 
right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast 
their votes effectively”44 may not be unduly burdened. The Supreme 
Court in California Democratic Party v. Jones emphasized the need 
for a compelling government interest by least restrictive means to pro-
tect a political party’s right of expressive association under the First 
Amendment, and the Court asserted representative democracy “is un-
imaginable without the ability of citizens to band together in promot-





the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.") (quoting NAACP v. Ala. ex 
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)); see also Patterson, at 460–61 ("Of course, it is imma-
terial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, 
religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom 
to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny."). 
 40.  See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460-61.  
 41.  City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1989). 
 42.  Id. 
 43. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 26 ("that '[t]he right to freely associate is not limited to “political” 
assemblies, but includes those that “pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit” of our 
citizens.'" (quoting Stanglin v. City of Dallas, 744 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex. App. 1987), writ de-
nied (Mar. 2, 1988), rev'd, 490 U.S. 19 (1989)); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1413 (19th ed. 2016). 
 44.  Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). 
 45.  Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000).  
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Before 1962, legislative districting controversies were considered 
to be non-justiciable political questions because plaintiffs had to state 
a case or controversy that satisfied the criteria for making an appropri-
ate judicial determination.46 In 1973, the Supreme Court first consid-
ered the issue of partisan gerrymandering in Gaffney v. Cummings.47 
In Gaffney, Justice White concluded in the majority opinion that the 
presence of political purposes in congressional redistricting is consti-
tutionally permissible.48 The Gaffney Court concluded that since tak-
ing politics out of the redistricting process was an unmanageable job 
for judges, the Supreme Court should not even try to limit the undem-
ocratic impact to politics on legislative redistricting.49 The implication 
of Gaffney was a lack of judicially manageable standards to regulate the 
limit on the anti-democratic impact of extreme politics in redistrict-
ing.50 The Gaffney Court suggested that partisan gerrymandering 
could possibly be unconstitutional, but failed to instruct how to apply 
manageable judicial standards to determine whether partisan gerry-
mandering violates the constitution.51 
In 1986, the Supreme Court reviewed Davis v. Bandemer and ad-
dressed the constitutionality of political gerrymandering (used loosely 
to describe the common practice of the party in power choosing the 
redistricting plan that gives it an advantage at the polls), and held that 
a “threshold showing of discriminatory vote dilution is required for a 
 
 46.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) ("Prominent on the surface of any case 
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment 
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determi-
nation of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of gov-
ernment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; 
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments 
on one question."); see also Sullivan & Feldman, supra note 43 at 814. 
 47.  Richard E. Finneran & Steven K. Luther, Filling the Gap in the Efficiency Gap: 
Measuring Partisan Gerrymandering on a Per-District Basis, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
385, 392 (2019) (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. (relying on Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 754). 
 51.  Id. 
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prima facie case of an equal protection violation,”52which is satisfied by 
showing intentional discrimination against an identifiable political 
group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.53 Despite this 
language, partisan gerrymandering claims have been rather unsuccess-
ful in seeking constitutional protection under the Equal Protection 
Clause.54 Chief Justice Roberts correctly perceived in Whitford that 
the Supreme Court’s prior attempts to resolve partisan gerrymander-
ing claims simply failed to provide clear and adequate judicial stand-
ards on how to resolve partisan gerrymandering allegations.55 The 
1986 partisan gerrymandering case of Davis v. Bandemer serves so far 
as the only case where the Court has held that allegations of partisan 
gerrymandering are hypothetically justiciable, stating that a potential 
Equal Protection Clause violation may exist where the electoral 
scheme extensively burdens an actual voter’s chance to realistically im-
pact partisan political practices.56 Bandemer recognizes partisan gerry-
mandering cases as hypothetically justiciable, and that an Equal Pro-
tection Clause violation could possibly exist in a case where the 
electoral scheme extensively burdens an actual voter’s chance to real-
istically impact partisan political practice.57 Although the Court in 
Bandemer agreed that partisan gerrymandering claims were theoreti-
cally justiciable under the equal protection clause, it rejected the Dis-
trict Court’s legal and factual bases for concluding that the Indiana re-
apportionment plan burden enough constitutionally protected rights 
to constitute a breach of the Equal Protection Clause on the merits of 
the case.58 
In Vieth v. Jubelirer,59 a gerrymandering case, Pennsylvania Dem-
ocrats challenged a redistricting plan they believed gave excessively 
promising partisan prospects to Republicans by sacrificing established 
redistricting principles.60 Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment 
(on affirming the circuit court and overturning Bandemer), but he 
 
 52.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986).  
 53.  See also Sullivan & Feldman, supra note 43 at 821.  
 54.  Finneran, supra note 47 at 392.  
 55.  Id. (citing Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926 (2018)). 
 56.  Id. at 393 (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)). 
 57.  Id. (citing Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 133 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Justice O'Connor 
was joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William Rehnquist)). 
 58.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 129-30 (1986). 
 59.  Finneran, supra note 47 at 394 (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004)). 
 60.  Id. (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272). 
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made it clear that he had hope for future “workable standards” that 
would “emerge to measure these burdens,” and that “courts should be 
prepared to order relief.”61 It is worth noting that “Justice Kennedy's 
opinion concurring in the judgment preserved Bandemer, even though 
he agreed with the plurality that no workable standard had yet been 
advanced to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims.”62 Subsequent 
partisan gerrymandering cases (including Rucho) made it clear that the 
Supreme Court has rejected the effects test in Bandemer as unaccepta-
ble because of the lack of discernable judicial standards to resolve the 
issue. 
The Court’s last partisan equal protection clause gerrymandering 
pronouncement before Whitford came in League of United Latin 
American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry.63 In LULAC, the Court ad-
dressed whether a judicially manageable standard had been established 
in partisan gerrymandering cases under an equal protection analysis. 
The Court in LULAC decided that a partisan gerrymandering injury 
is required to be based on an injury to real voters.64 The pre-Whitford 
cases demonstrate that the Court has avoided granting relief on the 










The expressive association freedoms claimed under the First 
Amendment cry out for relief from the Court because the failure to 
award legislative seats statewide reasonably proportionate to the bal-
lots cast for any political party is a significant burden on expressive 
 
 61.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 62.  Finneran, supra note 47 at 394  
 63.  Id. at 395 (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) 
[hereinafter LULAC]). 
 64.  Id. (citing LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420). 
 65.  Id. at 395-96. 
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representational rights. I believe the Court could readily order an of-
fending state legislature to correct the problem and subject the legis-
lature to initial monitoring by the courts as needed. A showing of ac-
tual harm is easily demonstrated when a group of partisan voters 
collectively and expressively casts ballots that entitle them to majority 
representation in the legislature to advance their expressive political 
agenda but the voters do not receive representation proportional to 
their votes. I think the right to collective representation by voters is 
severely burdened by significant underrepresentation of legislative 
seats. The actual harm suffered by an actual group of voters, or an in-
dividual voter should be redressed by the Court.66 The fact that lower 
federal courts have granted standing in partisan gerrymandering cases 
supports the argument that partisan cases are not correctly treated as 
political question issues because these cases reveal that federal courts 
are quite capable of resolving partisan gerrymander issues under a First 
Amendment freedom of association analysis. Partisan gerrymandering 
causes real proportional representation harm to real voters who do not 
receive representation statewide proportional to their statewide vote; 
it is not is a political question because non-politicized lower federal 
courts use manageable discernable judicial standards to grant relief 
from unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering issues caused by a state 
legislature’s collective proportional representation harm of plaintiffs. 
In 2018, in Gill v. Whitford, the Supreme Court held that because 
the plaintiffs challenging partisan gerrymandering suffered a district-
specific gerrymandering injury, the plaintiffs on remand must also 
show a statewide injury-in-fact in order to meet the standing require-
ment under the Supreme Court’s unsettled and unresolved gerryman-
dering justiciability jurisprudence.67 In 2019, Gill v. Whitford was re-
manded to the trial court where the plaintiffs raised justiciability, 
standing, First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment political ger-
rymandering issues.68 The trial court allowed discovery to proceed as 
scheduled over a motion to stay, but the court said it would delay the 
trial and any decision on the merits until after the Supreme Court had 
 
 66.  See id. at 396. 
 67.  See generally Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
 68.  See Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-CV-421-JDP, 2019 WL 294800 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 23, 
2019). 
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decided Common Cause v. Rucho69 and Benisek v. Lamone,70 as those 
decisions could produce game-changing implications for the issues 
raised by Whitford.71 The Court’s decision in Common Cause v. 
Rucho unfortunately denied a federal judicial remedy because of the 
political question doctrine.72 Because I predict that the Court’s holding 
and rationale in Common Cause v. Rucho73 will have a relatively short 
shelf-life, it is worthwhile to review those cases which implicitly or di-
rectly did not determine partisan gerrymandering to be a political 
question.74 
 Gill v. Whitford held that plaintiff voters lacked standing be-
cause they had not demonstrated a particularized injury because the 
injury was district-specific and not statewide. The plaintiffs alleged the 
state’s redistricting plan because of partisan gerrymandering nega-
tively impacted the composition of the state legislature because parti-
san gerrymandering “unreasonably burdens their First Amendment 
rights of association.”75 The right of political association safeguards a 
collective concern in the honest operation of the electoral process.76 
Extreme partisan gerrymandering infringes on the right of association 
by severely impeding one’s fair and reasonable representation in the 
electoral process without a compelling government interest.77 The 
right of political association without burdensome representative dilu-
tion statewide is similar to the First Amendment’s prohibition on con-
 
 69.  318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D.N.C. 2018). 
 70.  348 F. Supp. 3d 493 (D. Md. 2018). 
 71.  See Whitford, 2019 WL 294800; see also Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 493; Common 
Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 777. 
 72.  See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. at 2484 (2019). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Smith, 335 F. Supp. 3d 988, 996-97 (S.D. Ohio 
2018). 
 75.  See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854, 55 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated and 
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
 76.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Election Law and Constitutional Law Scholars in Support 
of Appellees at 7-8, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No.16-1161), 2017 WL 3948425 
("This Court's patronage cases similarly recognize that the right of association protects both the 
individual interest in associating with like-minded others and the collective interest in 'the free 
functioning of the electoral process.' . . . Elrod and its progeny also illustrate the centrality of 
political parties to the right of association—and the corresponding harms arising from the dom-
inant party's discrimination against a non-dominant party to entrench itself in power."). 
 77.  Id. at 19. 
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tent and viewpoint discrimination as violations of the freedom of ex-
pression.78 When citizens vote for a political party in furtherance of 
political goals with like-minded individuals, the government may not 
undermine collective associational political expression in the absence 
of a compelling government interest.79 Supporters of these extreme 
partisan gerrymandering plans leave the collective associational rights 
of minority party voters behind with the flawed argument that in the 
absence of a significant discriminatory effect on a minority political 
party with a majority of the popular vote, the minority political party 
has not suffered a harm in not having partisan seats reasonably corre-
lated with that of the popular vote. An intentional redistricting plan 
that yields districts designed to give one party an unreasonable and un-
fair electoral advantage over another creates a chilling effect on the 
political association rights statewide in violation of the First Amend-
ment’s strict scrutiny requirements.80 Evidence reveals that the pur-
pose of partisan gerrymandering plans is to severely impair the effec-
tiveness of the collective political speech of a collection of citizens on 
the basis of their political affiliation.81 
After Gill v. Whitford, recent decisions in several federal district 
courts have granted standing to challengers of the extreme partisan 
gerrymandering practice of “cracking” and “packing” under the theory 
that the challengers may have suffered a statewide political injury as a 
result of an unconstitutional infringement on their collective right of 
expressive association.82 In my view, it is significant to note that the 
 
 78.  See id. at 5 ("Freedom of association is closely linked to the First Amendment's pro-
hibition on content and viewpoint discrimination. This Court has held that, '[a]bove all else, the 
First Amendment 'means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its mes-
sage, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.' This principle applies with special force where 
political speech is concerned, to ensure that the dominant political group may not stifle or di-
minish the collective voice of its opponents." (quoting Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 
92, 95 (1972)). 
 79.  Id. at 19. 
 80.  Contra id. at 16 ("In the context of redistricting, then, there must be a significant 
discriminatory effect on a political party and its adherents for the restriction to be deemed 'se-
vere.' The mere fact that a redistricting plan yields districts that tend to result in one party's 
having an electoral advantage over another does not alone demonstrate discrimination or compel 
strict scrutiny." (Cf. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992))). 
 81.  See Steven Semeraro, Partisan Gerrymandering: Is There No Shame in It or Have 
Politicians Become Shameless?, 48 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1, 40 (2017) ("[I]nstead of choosing to re-
spect statewide vote totals, the majority party in the legislature used statistical predictions to 
choose a map that would produce radically disproportional results. Choosing that map revealed 
the drafters' requisite intent to discriminate . . ."). 
 82.  See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); Benisek v. Lamone, 
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lower court’s grant of standing in partisan gerrymandering cases 
demonstrates that these cases are not properly treated as political ques-
tion issues because the federal courts are quite capable of resolving 
partisan gerrymander issues under a First Amendment freedom of as-
sociation analysis. Although this article focuses on the implications of 
extreme partisan gerrymandering on the right to the freedom of polit-
ical association and expression, recent polls suggest that the public may 
have come to believe that highly partisan judicial appointments have 
unreasonably influenced the Supreme Court's interest in establishing 
clear rules to eliminate the negative impact of partisan gerrymandering 
by deciding that redistricting with intentional partisan bias is not pro-
hibited.83 In Rucho v. Common Cause,84 the Court clearly refused to 
judicially remove the negative impact of partisan gerrymandering on 
the electoral process by declaring that partisan gerrymandering claims 
are political questions outside the reach of federal courts. 
  
 
348 F. Supp. 3d 493 (D. Md. 2018); Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D. N.C. 
2018); Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Smith, 335 F. Supp. 3d 988 (S.D. Ohio 2018), appeal 
docketed, No. 19-70 (U.S. July 12, 2019). 
 83.  See New Bipartisan Poll Shows Support for Supreme Court to Establish Clear Rules 
for Gerrymandering¸ CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER (Jan. 28, 2019), https://campaignlegal.org/up-
date/new-bipartisan-poll-shows-support-supreme-court-establish-clear-rules-gerrymandering 
("Nearly three-quarters of voters support the U.S. Supreme Court establishing clear rules for 
when gerrymandering violates the Constitution, with broad support extending across partisan 
and racial lines . . . [a]t least 60 percent of Democrats, Independents and Republicans support the 
creation of independent redistricting commissions."); see also Jenny Jarvie, Why Texas Is Texas: 
A Gerrymandering Case Cuts to the Core of the State's Transformation, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 11, 
2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-texas-gerrymander-20170711-story.html 
("Voting rights advocates have long accused Texas Republicans of working to undermine the 
growing political clout of Latino and African American voters by intentionally—and unfairly—
cramming them into districts or splitting them up so they are outnumbered. Republican legisla-
tors still control roughly two-thirds of State House and Senate and congressional seats."); Olga 
Pierce & Kate Rabinowitz, 'Partisan' Gerrymandering Is Still About Race, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 9, 
2017, 6:48 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/partisan-gerrymandering-is-still-about-race 
("This is, in fact, a dilution of Democratic voting power. But it also places thousands of African-
American and Latino citizens in a heavily white district where they have little hope of electing a 
candidate who will represent their interests."). 
 84.  139 S. Ct. 2484. 
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Gerrymandering issues are justiciable only if there is a showing of 
discriminatory intent and effect.85 The Supreme Court of the United 
States has held that a showing of simply a political advantage is not 
enough to demonstrate discriminatory intent and effect as to show a 
cognizable injury.86 The alleged harm of a dilution of votes is limited 
to the district in which a plaintiff lives because the plaintiff has not 
suffered a statewide injury.87 However, the First Amendment impli-
cates an “associational” injury from partisan gerrymandering because 
partisan gerrymandering burdens “the ability of like-minded people 
across the State to affiliate in a political party and carry out that organ-
ization’s activities and object[ives]. . . This ‘associational harm of a par-
tisan gerrymander is distinct from vote dilution.’”88 While rejecting 
“district-specific vote-dilution claims under the First Amendment, 
partisan plaintiffs ‘could make use of statewide evidence and seek a 
statewide remedy.’”89 Redressing the alleged statewide harm requires 
a state legislature to revise only such districts as are necessary to re-
shape the voter’s district so that the voter may be unpacked or 
uncracked.90 “[S]ome members of the Supreme Court have expressed 
the view that judicial enforcement of the principle that each voter has 
a right to have his vote treated equally must be limited to situations 
where the dilution is based on classifications such as race and popula-
tion. These reservations have been grounded in the concern that dis-
tinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate political motivations is 
not a task to be undertaken by judges.”91 Justice Kennedy’s and Justice 
Steven’s opinions in Vieth v. Jubelirer92 articulate their belief that in 
partisan gerrymandering cases the First Amendment may prohibit the 
 
 85.  See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 660 (1993) (White, J., dissenting). 
 86.  Id. at 659 (White, J., dissenting) 
 87.  See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930-31 (2018). 
 88.  See Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Householder, 367 F. Supp. 3d 697, 712 (S.D. 
Ohio, 2019) (quoting Gill, 137 S. Ct. at 1938). 
 89.  Id. (quoting Gill, 137 S. Ct. at 1934). 
 90.  See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1921.  
 91.  See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 883 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated and re-
manded, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).). 
 92.  541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
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state from placing burdens on voters on the basis of their allies or their 
viewpoints.93 
The Supreme Court has expressed an emphasis on ensuring that 
an individual’s vote receive the same weight as every other person’s 
vote, which necessarily implicates that individual’s associational 
rights.94 The Court previously has observed the link between the right 
to vote and the right to associate by describing a partisan unit whose 
members share a particular viewpoint, associational preference, or eco-
nomic status.95 Analogous to ballot-access cases where independent 
party members were unduly burdened by State regulations that in-
fringed on those party members’ right of association, minority party 
members such as those in Gill v. Whitford are significantly burdened 
by extreme partisan gerrymandering and lack of fair representation.96 
“A burden that falls unequally on new or small political parties or on 
independent candidates impinges, by its very nature, on associational 
choices protected by the First Amendment. It discriminates against 
those candidates and voters whose political preferences lie outside the 
existing political parties.”97 In Whitford it was said, “[W]hen the state 
places an artificial burden on the ability of voters of a certain political 
persuasion to form a legislative majority, it necessarily diminishes the 
weight of the vote of each of those voters when compared to the votes 
of individuals favoring another view. The burdened voter simply has a 
diminished or even no opportunity to effect a legislative majority. That 
voter is, in essence, an unequal participant in the decisions of the body 
 
 93.  See id. at 270, 294 (Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion: "While the equal protec-
tion standard continues to govern such cases, the First Amendment may prove to offer a sounder 
and more prudential basis for judicial intervention in political gerrymandering cases. First 
Amendment analysis does not dwell on whether a generally permissible classification has been 
used for an impermissible purpose, but concentrates on whether the legislation burdens the rep-
resentational rights of the complaining party's voters for reasons of ideology, beliefs, or political 
association"; Justice Steven's dissenting opinion: "To say that suppression of political speech (a 
claimed First Amendment violation) triggers strict scrutiny is not to say that failure to give polit-
ical groups equal representation (a claimed equal protection violation) triggers strict scrutiny. 
Only an equal protection claim is before us in the present case—perhaps for the very good reason 
that a First Amendment claim, if it were sustained, would render unlawful all consideration of 
political affiliation in districting, just as it renders unlawful all consideration of political affiliation 
in hiring for non-policy-level government jobs"). 
 94.  See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 881. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See id. 
 97.  See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793–94 (1983). 
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politic.”98 Justice Stevens expressed that the freedom of association in 
political belief and affiliation constituted the core of those activities 
that are protected by the First Amendment, and any infringement by 
the government to burden those interests is subject to strict scrutiny.99 
According to Professor Steven Semeraro, data show that as a result of 
modern sophisticated redistricting software, when designing districts, 
controlling political parties are able with pinpoint precision to signifi-
cantly distort the true representation of minority party voters in their 
political party as a whole within a state, essentially shutting the minor-
ity party out of the political process while ignoring traditional district-
ing requirements such as compactness, contiguity, and the like.100 
According to the complaint in Gill v. Whitford, the Wisconsin re-
districting plan known as Act 43 was drafted to purposely distribute 
the predicted Republican vote share with greater efficiency so that it 
translated into a greater number of seats, while purposely distributing 
the Democratic vote share with less efficiency so that it would translate 
into fewer seats.101 The plaintiffs alleged the act was drafted and en-
acted with the specific discriminatory intent to maximize the electoral 
advantage of Republicans and harm Democrats to the greatest possible 
extent.102 Furthermore, according to the plaintiffs, the act resulted in a 
specific discriminatory effect as demonstrated by data which shows a 
substantial Republican efficiency gap advantage in 2012 as well as in 
2014, although a very reliable “Demonstration Plan” reduced the effi-
ciency gap to 2% in 2012, with an operation equal to Act 43 in all the 
additional applicable metric.103 It is the contention of the plaintiffs that 
 
 98.  See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 882–83. 
 99.  Id. at 875. (citations omitted) 
 100.  See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 663 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) ("'[A]n equal pro-
tection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain 
voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively.' . . . By this, I meant that 
the group must exhibit 'strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair representa-
tion,' so that it could be said that it has 'essentially been shut out of the political process.'"(quoting 
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133, 140 (1986)); see also, Semeraro supra note 81 at 27 ("As 
early as 2004 . . . redistricting software was so sophisticated and powerful that . . . [g]erryman-
derers could thus pick and choose among different maps until they found the one that produced 
their desired partisan result while also according with some traditional districting principles and 
thus triggering the least suspicion."). 
 101.  See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 855. 
 102.  Id. at 855. 
 103.  Id. 
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the “Demonstration Plan” directly evidences the majority party’s in-
tent to discriminate against the minority party members’ right of ex-
pressive political association without a compelling justification and 
without considering least restrictive means, because the majority party 
adopted ACT 43 because it knew that Act would waste a significant 
number of votes cast for the Democrats. The injury-in-fact, when con-
sidered together with the underlying issue of a lack of representation 
as a whole, is not a mere dilution of votes in regards to a political edge, 
but an infringement of the minority party members’ right to associa-
tion.104 Moreover, additional data demonstrates circumstantial evi-
dence of intentional repression of ethnic and racial minorities’ power 
in the political process.105 For example, in Wisconsin's 2012 election, 
the majority party received 60.6% of the legislative seats, but the ma-
jority party won less than half of the popular vote. And in 2014, alt-
hough the minority party won the same proportion of the vote as in 
2012, its legislative seats were reduced to 36.4% of the available 
seats.106 Thus, according to the plaintiffs’ complaint, this type of ex-
treme political gerrymandering infringes on one’s ability to advance 
the group’s shared viewpoints by translating that partisan association 
into political power through the ballot,107 and demonstrates the major-
ity party’s intent to discriminate against a rival group and its supporters 
 
 104.  See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 at 110 (Justice White's plurality opinion: "un-
constitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that 
will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a 
whole."). 
 105.  See Joshua Butera, Partisan Gerrymandering and Qualifications Clause, 95 B.U. L. 
REV. 303, 328 (2015) ("The strongest evidence would likely come from election results data 
before and after redistricting. In addition, the election results data should show the significant 
difficulty for a candidate to win when the district was drawn with the intent that candidates from 
that party not be able to win. For example, in North Carolina in 2012, it should not be difficult 
to prove that gerrymandering substantially harmed Democratic candidates when they won 51% 
of the votes cast statewide but a minority of the state's seats."). 
 106.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Election Law and Constitutional Law Scholars in Support 
of Appellees, supra note 76 at 3 ("Here, there can be no doubt that Wisconsin's plan severely 
burdens the associational rights of the minority party and its adherents. To cite just one example 
of the abundant evidence of party-based discrimination in the record: Republicans received 
roughly 48% of the statewide vote and garnered 60.6% of the state's Assembly seats in 2012; two 
years later, when Democrats received the same percentage of the vote, they captured only 36.4% 
of the seats, or 24 seats fewer out of a total of 99. There is no compelling justification for the 
discriminatory burden that Wisconsin's plan imposes on the non-dominant party and its adher-
ents."). 
 107.  Id. at 11-12. 
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with the purpose and effect of diminishing the minority party’s collec-
tive voice as a whole in the electoral process.108 The argument of the 
plaintiffs against extreme partisan gerrymandering is good public pol-
icy because voters are more likely to come out vote for the party can-
didate of their choice if they believe both their individual ballot and 
collective ballots invoking the right of association matter when it 
comes to determining how many legislative seats their political party 
will be entitled to. The creation of extreme partisan gerrymandering 
plans that create an efficiency gap above 7% statewide will continue to 
favor the entrenched party throughout the life of the plan under any 
likely electoral scenario.109 In the absence of an “unprecedented polit-
ical earthquake,” the partisan gerrymandering plan would keep the mi-
nority party at a disadvantage as a political party statewide while sev-
erally burdening the minority party’s associational rights over the life 
of the plan.110 The sheer magnitude of the difference between those 
less restrictive alternative plans that would create an efficiency gap of 
2.2% for example, and those above 7%, illustrates clear intention that 
the discriminatory burden on associational rights is not the necessary 
byproduct of other governmental interests, but rather is the purpose 






There are a number of post-Gill federal court decisions addressing 
the First Amendment gerrymandering issue with very plausible claim 
recognition theories. For example, about two months after the Su-
preme Court's decision in Gill, in Ohio A. Philip Randolph Institute 
v. Smith, a federal district court in Ohio, while speaking about the 
plaintiff’s First Amendment rights in the context of a gerrymandering 
challenge, acknowledged that First Amendment issues may appear 
 
 108.  Id. at 12. 
 109.  Id. at 21-24. (citing Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 905 (W.D. Wis. 2016), va-
cated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) 
 110.  Id. (quoting Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 905).  
 111.  Id. at 24. 
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when legislative apportionment has the purpose and effect of burden-
ing a group of voters’ representational rights because of their perspec-
tives on partisan politics.112 
After the 2010 Census, the Republican-dominated Ohio General 
Assembly authorized redrawing congressional districts.113 It was al-
leged that Republicans used the 2011 reapportionment map to inten-
tionally advance their interest in controlling legislative districts.114 The 
plaintiffs asserted that the Republicans’ goal was to consolidate Repub-
lican congressional supremacy.115 
In a concurring opinion in Gill, Justice Kagan took the position 
that in a partisan gerrymandering case alleging a violation of the First 
Amendment it is very plausible for a plaintiff to satisfy the standing 
test.116 Justice Kagan believes that for purpose of standing, an injury-
in-fact in a partisan gerrymandering case takes place if the partisan 
conduct unduly burdens the ability of voters of a targeted political 
party all over the State to freely associate in order to promote a partisan 
agenda.117 If the associational injury is statewide, then by necessary im-
plication the relevant statewide standing requirement has been met.118 
The plaintiffs contend they established an injury-in-fact under Justice 
Kagan’s test because the 2011 map unduly burdens the partisan power 
of Democrats to freely associate.119 The plaintiffs claim that the map 
burdens the right of association of voters for supporting or identifying 
with the views of Democrats.120 Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted 
that because of a lack of either a legitimate state interest or a compel-
ling state interest, Ohio’s partisan district boundaries failed because of 
a lack of adequate justification.121 The court appropriately found that 
the individual Ohio plaintiffs each alleged specific facts signifying a 
“concrete and particularized” injury.122 The individual plaintiffs 
 
 112.  Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Smith, 335 F. Supp. 3d 988, 996-97 (S.D. Ohio 
2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-70 (U.S. July 12, 2019).  
 113.  Id. at 993. 
 114.  Id. at 997. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id. (citing Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1939 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring)). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
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claimed they suffered definite burdens on their freedom of association 
because partisan gerrymandering undermined the Democrats’ profi-
ciency in implementing plans, which qualifies as an injury under Jus-
tice Kagan’s analysis.123Justice Kagan’s injury-in-fact theory for parti-
san gerrymandering strongly suggests that harms caused by partisan 
gerrymandering are justiciable because they are capable of judicial res-
olution and should not be categorically treated as political questions.124 
The 2011 map burdens plaintiffs’ partisan activities by targeting 
Democrats with unreasonable partisan attacks.125 Plaintiffs demon-
strated injury-in-fact, under the Kagan rationale, because the 2011 
map increased the challenge of appealing to voters during the course 
of registration.126 
All of the plaintiffs in Ohio A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Smith 
have adequately pleaded an injury-in-fact under the standards ex-
pressed in Justice Kagan’s concurrence in Gill.127 Moreover, a three-
judge district court panel in Maryland adopted a theory of the injury-
in-fact separate from the proposal made by Justice Kagan.128 The Mar-
yland panel discussed a partisan gerrymandering claim as being pro-
hibited by the First Amendment.129 The Shapiro panel believed that to 
present an injury-in-fact, “the plaintiff must show that the challenged 
map diluted the votes of the targeted citizens to such a degree that it 
resulted in a tangible and concrete adverse effect. In other words, the 
vote dilution must make some practical difference.”130 A First Amend-
ment claim of partisan gerrymandering is plausible if the intentional 
manipulation of redistricting the data makes it more difficult for tar-
geted partisan voters to freely associate in order to achieve electoral 
success because of their past exercise of their right of freedom of par-
tisan association.131 Under the standing requirement, the plaintiffs 
have a duty to plead sufficient facts to show that the injury they have 
 
 123.  Id. (citing Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1939 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring)). 
 124.  See id. 
 125.  Id. (citing Gill, 138 S.Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring)). 
 126.  Id. (citing Gill, 138 S.Ct. at 1939 (Kagan, J., concurring)). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 996, 998 (citing Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 595, 595-98 (D. Md. 
2016)).  
 130.  Id. at 997 (citing Shapiro, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 597). 
 131.  Id. 
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suffered is legitimately caused by the challenged conduct of the de-
fendant.132 The plaintiffs met the standing causation requirement by 
alleging that the state created the map with an express intent of bur-
dening a minority political party, and that the map assisted in realizing 
this impermissible goal.133 The plaintiffs satisfy the standing redressa-
bility mandate by showing that a favorable decision would redress their 
claimed First Amendment injury.134 Their injury could be redressed 
since they are requesting an injunction that stops Ohio from creating 
congressional maps with the intent of burdening a group’s representa-
tional rights because of “their political beliefs, political party member-
ship, registration, affiliations or political activities, or voting histo-
ries.”135 
I support the view that the standing analysis is relevant to a political 
question under a non-justiciability analysis when a federal court de-
cides that even if the plaintiff has suffered an injury, the injury is not 
capable of a judicial resolution because of a lack of discernable man-
ageable judicial standards. The lower federal court federal cases in 
both Ohio and Maryland simply use the standing analysis with an em-
phasis on injury to demonstrate that are not truly non-justiciable po-





A.  Facts of Rucho v. Common Cause before the Supreme 
Court 
 Plaintiffs in North Carolina and Maryland challenged congres-
sional districting plans in their states alleging the reapportionment 
plans violated the constitution because they were designed to promote 
extremely partisan interest in reapportionment.136 This section focuses 
 
 132.  Id. (citing Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167, 180 
(2000)).  
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180)  
 136.  Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019). 
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on their First Amendment allegations. The federal district courts in 
both states ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed 
directly to the Supreme Court.137 While considering these cases, the 
Court once again abandoned its duty to hold that claims of excessive 
partisanship in districting are “justiciable” and properly suited for res-
olution by the federal courts.138 The Supreme Court did not invalidate 
a districting plan as creating an unconstitutional partisan gerryman-
der139 because the Court inexplicably fails to understand the available 
judicially manageable standards for deciding such claims easily identi-
fied by the lower courts.140 If the lower courts have been able to iden-
tify manageable judicial standards, why can’t the Supreme Court? One 
plausible explanation may be that some of the justices on the Court 
may implicitly want to preserve a Republican gerrymandering ad-
vantage.141 Of course, it could be merely coincidental that all of the 
justices voting to treat partisan gerrymandering as a political question 
were from the political party with a current demonstrated partisan ger-
rymandering advantage. Unlike the Supreme Court, the courts below 
appropriately exercised judicial power when they found that the highly 
partisan districting plans were unconstitutional.142 
The partisan gerrymandering case, Rucho v. Common Cause, in-
volves a challenge to a Republican-sponsored congressional redistrict-
ing plan in North Carolina.143 The second partisan congressional ger-
rymandering case before the Court, Lamone v. Benisek, involved a 
Democrat-sponsored plan in the state of Maryland.144 The plaintiffs 
alleged the districting scheme was prohibited by the First Amend-
ment.145 The federal district court considered the plaintiffs’ allegations 
 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Contra id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst., 335 F.Supp.3d at 998 (citing Shapiro v. McManus, 
203 F. Supp.3d 595–98 (D. Md. 2019)).  
 141.  See Associated Press, supra note 9. 
 142.  See Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst., 335 F.Supp.3d at 998 (citing Shapiro, 203 F. Supp. 
3d at 595–98).  
 143.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491. 
 144.  Id. at 2493.  
 145.  Id. 
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and decided that the Maryland plan infringed upon the plaintiffs’ free-
dom of association.146 An appeal was filed with the Supreme Court by 
way of 28 United States Code Section 1253.147 
B.  Analysis of Rucho v. Common Cause before the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court refused to hold extreme partisan gerryman-
dering was unconstitutional.148 The Court’s 5-4 judgment in Rucho v. 
Common Cause, that partisan gerrymandering of federal legislative 
districts was not capable of judicial resolution by the federal courts be-
cause of the lack of discernable manageable judicial standards, was ren-
dered without any legitimate constitutional justification, according to 
a stinging dissent by Justice Elena Kagan.149 Chief Justice John Rob-
erts, author of the majority opinion, said that what the allegedly in-
jured plaintiffs were requesting was an exceptional extension of judicial 
power.150 According to Chief Justice Roberts, the dissent want an un-
precedented increase in judicial influence in partisan gerrymander-
ing.151 The Supreme Court has consistently refused to invalidate a par-
tisan gerrymander as prohibited by the constitution—and the Court 
has rejected the many prior invitations it has received over the last 45 
years to prohibit partisan gerrymandering.152 This requested increase 
of judicial influence involving partisan gerrymandering would involve 
judging extremely partisan American political life as it is linked to re-
apportionment.153 Chief Justice Roberts believes the Supreme Court 
should reject the opportunity to resolve partisan gerrymandering 
claims on the merits because undue judicial influence would inherently 
exist if the Supreme Court involves itself in resolving partisan gerry-
mandering issues.154 According to Chief Justice Roberts, once the Su-
preme Court started to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering cases, its 
 
 146.  Id. (quoting Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 498 (D. Md. 2018), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019)). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Galen Druke, Partisan Gerrymandering Isn't The Supreme Court's Problem Any-
more, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT (June 27, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/par-
tisan-gerrymandering-isnt-the-supreme-courts-problem-anymore/. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507.  
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
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authority would be unrestrained in range and time.155 If federal judges 
heard partisan gerrymandering cases on the merits, the undue judicial 
influence problem would continue to repeat itself nationally “with each 
new round of districting, for state as well as federal representatives. 
Consideration of the impact of today's ruling on democratic principles 
cannot ignore the effect of the unelected and politically unaccountable 
branch of the Federal Government assuming such an extraordinary 
and unprecedented role.”156 In her dissent, Justice Kagan reminded 
Chief Justice Roberts that the Court had abandoned its affirmative 
duty to resolve the constitutional violations created by partisan gerry-
mandering.157 Justice Kagan’s dissent was appropriately critical of 
Chief Justice Roberts’ claim that the dissent was seeking to expand ju-
dicial power, because the dissent proposed a well-reasoned traditional 
constitutional law analysis to allow the Supreme Court to exercise its 
judicial power to resolve a partisan gerrymandering problem that 
should be prohibited by the constitution.158 According to Justice Ka-
gan, “For the first time ever, this Court refuses to remedy a constitu-
tional violation because it thinks the task beyond judicial capabili-
ties.”159 Justice Kagan reasoned that placing restrictions on 
gerrymandered districts is unequivocally within the scope of the Su-
preme Court.160 Justice Kagan said, “The partisan gerrymanders here 
debased and dishonored our democracy, turning upside-down the core 
American idea that all governmental power derives from the peo-
ple.”161 In the past, prior to retiring in 2018, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
took the position “that partisan gerrymandering was within the pur-
view of the court but that the justices should hold off on ruling any 
particular gerrymander unconstitutional until a manageable standard 
for measuring gerrymandering emerged.”162 By ruling that partisan 
gerrymandering is not an issue for the federal courts to resolve, the 
Supreme Court failed to do its job of protecting American democracy 
 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Galen Druke, Partisan Gerrymandering Isn't The Supreme Court's Problem Any-
more, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT (June 27, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/par-
tisan-gerrymandering-isnt-the-supreme-courts-problem-anymore/ 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
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by rejecting the excellent road map for resolving partisan gerryman-
dering issues handed to it by the lower court in Rucho v. Common 
Cause.163 A majority of Americans who may take issue with extreme 
partisan gerrymandering164 may now also question whether the Su-
preme Court was acting in an impartial manner to protect the rights 
of voters. Americans may question whether the Court operates free of 
partisan politics, because each justice voted on the partisan gerryman-
dering issue in a manner that may have suggested to a casual observer 
that the justice was either a so-called Republican justice or a so-called 
Democrat justice rather than an independent justice of the Court serv-
ing free of political pressure or prestige. 
Representative Hakeem Jeffries, who leads the House Democratic 
Caucus, recently suggested on CNN’s “New Day” that the role of Su-
preme Court justices and the court-packing question should be an is-
sue given focused consideration for the November 2020 federal elec-
tions.165 The court-packing concept is questionable as a historical and 
practical matter, but it resurfaced in 2019.166 A court-packing strategy 
was perhaps inspired by the 2016 denial of President Barrack Obama’s 
nominee Merrick Garland a confirmation hearing before the Senate.167 
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said that although the 
Obama nominee to the Supreme Court was not given an opportunity 
to fill a vacant seat, under similar circumstances he would encourage 
the Senate to accept and give its consent to confirm a Trump-spon-
sored Supreme Court candidate.168 “McConnell’s comments were an 
audacious reversal of his 2016 election-year position blocking Garland 
for the vacancy caused by the sudden death that February of Justice 
Antonin Scalia. McConnell argued that the seat should be filled by 
whoever won the then-upcoming presidential election.”169 One lead-
ing candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination, Senator 
Bernie Sanders of Vermont, does not endorse the Supreme-Court-
 
 163.  Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2492-93 (2019). 
 164.  Druke, supra note 157. 
 165.  Joan Biskupic, Democrats Look At Packing The Supreme Court To Pack The Vote, 
CNN POLITICS (last updated May 21, 2019 6:04 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/31/poli-
tics/ democrats-supreme-court-packing-politics/index.html. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
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packing schemes.170 Senator Sanders disapproves of “court packing” 
because he appropriately believes it is likely to benefit Republicans.171 
Sanders proposed term limits for Supreme Court justices. 
Separate and distinct from the Court packing issue both parties 
have engaged in activities that have placed the Supreme Court and the 
entire judiciary in the center of current politics.172 In July of 2019, 
President Trump tweeted that “the country needs ‘more Republi-
cans . . . And must ALWAYS hold the Supreme Court.’” Also during 
this month, he “disparaged a judge based on his appointment by the 
Democrat Obama.”173 While commenting on a ruling that an account-
ing firm was required to deliver Trump’s financial records, the Presi-
dent characterized the decision as an improper decision rendered by 
an Obama-appointed judge.174 Trump’s and Senator McConnell’s par-
tisan comments regarding the federal judiciary undermine the optic of 
federal judicial independence.175 New York University Law Professor 
Barry Friedman contends that a politicized judiciary is totally at war 
with the goal of independent judicial review.176 Chief Justice John Rob-
erts has attempted to discourage public officials from referring to fed-
eral judges as either an Obama Judge or a Trump judge. 177 Chief Jus-
tice Roberts advanced the view that America has a remarkable 
collection of dedicated judges committed to treating equally those 
coming into their courts.178 
The Court’s Rucho v. Common Cause opinion may very well in-
cite politicization claims.179 In Rucho v. Common Cause,180 the issue 
of judicial politicization instinctively appears in the mind of a reason-
able observer when a group of five Supreme Court justices appointed 
by presidents identified with the Republican Party vote to support a 
political question theory that has the practical effect of leaving in place 
an established partisan gerrymandering advantage for the Republican 
 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 180.  Id. 
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Party.181 The Supreme Court ruled that partisan gerrymandering 
claims were not justiciable without a well-reasoned justification.182 
While reviewing Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion183 that partisan 
gerrymandering is justiciable, it occurred to me that it is very likely 
that a politicized justice on the Court would apply the political ques-
tion doctrine to partisan gerrymandering in an effort to preserve a Re-
publican partisan gerrymandering advantage.184 It is plausible to argue 
there are five politicized Republican appointed Justices on the Roberts 
Court because after conceding that excessive partisan gerrymandering 
produces outcomes incompatible with democratic principles, the Su-
preme Court denies plaintiffs a federal judicial remedy.185 I reject the 
Court’s assertion that the federal judiciary does not know how to de-
velop manageable standards to protect core democratic principles, be-
cause the lower federal courts have demonstrated how to utilize judi-
cial standards to resolve partisan gerrymandering issues.186 It is my 
position that an implicitly politicized majority of justices on the Court 
decided that partisan gerrymandering claims present political ques-
tions beyond the scope of the federal courts because of the demon-
strated partisan gerrymandering advantage currently held by the Re-
publicans.187 “Supreme Court justices insist that politics plays no role 
in their decision-making. But their voting patterns and the titanic par-
tisan confirmation battles for seats on the court tell a different 
story.”188 The belief that politics play no role in the decision-making 
process was made “before the start of a successful 10-month Republi-
can blockade of President Barack Obama's nomination of Judge Mer-
rick B. Garland. The senators who refused to give Judge Garland a 
hearing appeared to disagree with the chief justice’s assessment.”189 Ac-
cording to Adam Liptak,190 who reports on the United States Supreme 
 
 181.  See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 9. 
 182.  See generally Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484. 
 183.  Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 184.  See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 9. 
 185.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507. 
 186.  Contra, id. 
 187.  See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 9. 
 188.  Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Judges Are Above Politics. It May Hear a Case 
Testing That View, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/ 09/16/us/politics/supreme-court-judges-partisanship.html. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Adam Liptak, THE NEW YORK TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/by/adam-lip-
tak, (last visited Dec. 8, 2019) (“Adam Liptak covers the United States Supreme Court and writes 
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Court and authors Sidebar, a column on legal activities, “Political sci-
ence data tends to support the politicians rather than the justices when 
it comes to whether politics plays a part in judges’ decisions. The 
data demonstrates a significant correlation between judges’ political 
affiliations and their voting.”191  One very informed commentator, Mi-
chael W. McConnell, a former federal appeals court judge and current 
law professor at Stanford, believes the goal of judging federal case 
without a political component at Supreme Court is only aspirational.192 
I advance the argument that the public may perceive that Repub-
lican-appointed justices on the Supreme Court refuse to address the 
First Amendment freedom of association partisan gerrymandering is-
sues because partisan gerrymandering typically preserves electoral 
power for the Republican Party.193 Unlike the indirectly politicized 
majority, I believe the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Rucho v. Com-
mon Cause condones excessive partisan gerrymandering while sending 
complaints about partisan gerrymandering to an inferior state court for 
a judicial remedy.194 
The introductory paragraph of Justice Kagan's dissent in Rucho v. 
Common Cause appropriately captures the unnecessary harm created 
by the Supreme Court's blatant refusal to remedy a constitutional vio-
lation, and is an adequate response to the flawed and unacceptable jus-
tification articulated by the Court for treating all partisan gerryman-
dering as a political question.195 Unlike Chief Justice Roberts, I believe 
when excessive partisanship in districting leads to results that reasona-
bly seem unjust and “incompatible with democratic principles," federal 
judges may be required to regulate political power between the two 
major political parties based upon reasoned merits found in the Con-
stitution.196 Judicial review of partisan gerrymandering meets those 
basic requirements.197 
 
Sidebar, a column on legal developments. A graduate of Yale Law School, he practiced law for 
14 years before joining The New York Times's news staff in 2002. He was a finalist for the 2009 
Pulitzer Prize in explanatory reporting. He has taught courses on the Supreme Court and the 
First Amendment at several law schools, including Yale and the University of Chicago.”). 
 191.  Liptak, supra note 188. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 9. 
 194.  Contra Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019). 
 195.  Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 196.  Contra Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506-07. 
 197.  Contra id. at 2507 
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Chief Justice Robert’s treatment of partisan gerrymandering as a 
political question should also be rejected because Justice Kagan 
pointed out how partisan gerrymandering may violate people's consti-
tutional rights.198 “That statement is not the lonesome cry of a dissent-
ing Justice. This Court has recognized extreme partisan gerrymander-
ing as such a violation for many years. Partisan gerrymandering 
operates through vote dilution—the devaluation of one citizen's vote 
as compared to others,”199 said Justice Kagan. 
According to Justice Kagan, the majority’s claim that it cannot ren-
der a judicial remedy because it thinks the task is beyond judicial capa-
bilities should be rejected.200 Under my analysis, the politicized major-
ity did not want to treat the partisan gerrymandering issue as a 
constitutional violation because it did not want to confront the demon-
strated partisan gerrymandering advantage for the Republicans. Parti-
san gerrymandering should not be treated as an ordinary constitutional 
disruption, because partisan gerrymanders in the cases before the 
Court robbed citizens of their fundamental constitutional right to have 
a say equally about political endeavors, to connect with others in order 
to broadcast political beliefs, and to choose political representatives.201 
sffK==`lk`irpflk=
Excessive partisan gerrymanders debase and dishonor America’s 
democracy by reversing the fundamental American belief that all gov-
ernmental power originates with the people.202 An insightful Justice 
Kagan, while speaking about harm caused by partisan gerrymandering, 
said, “These gerrymanders enabled politicians to entrench themselves 
in office as against voters’ preferences. They promoted partisanship 
above respect for the popular will. They encouraged a politics of po-
larization and dysfunction. If left unchecked, gerrymanders like the 
ones here may irreparably damage our system of government.”203 I 
consider a politicized justice on the Supreme Court to be a justice who 
 
 198.  Id. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. 
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very predictably engages in suspect legal reasoning in an effort to sup-
port the position of the political party identified with the president 
who nominated him or her for a position on the Court. Scrutinizing a 
partisan, politically inspired gerrymander is not beyond the compe-
tence of courts with judges or justices who follow the dictates of the 
Constitution rather than the recognized goals of partisan politicians 
seeking a political advantage at the expense of democracy.204 Justice 
Kagan said, “The majority’s abdication comes just when courts across 
the country, including those below, have coalesced around manageable 
judicial standards to resolve partisan gerrymandering claims.”205 
The observed judicial standards utilized by lower courts to con-
clude that partisan gerrymandering is not a political question actually 
meet the standards set by an apparently politicized majority on the 
Court.206 Objective judicial standards, when applied by judges who are 
not politicized, allow lower federal court judges to protect the freedom 
of association of partisan voters.207 Proper judicial standards, when ap-
plied by judges who are truly independent of partisan bias, will limit 
courts to fixing only egregious gerrymanders and will prevent impar-
tial judges from excessively getting involved in the political process.208 
Neutral judicial standards when applied by the lower courts in an im-
partial manner permit “judicial intervention in the worst-of-the-worst 
cases of democratic subversion, causing blatant constitutional harms. 
In other words, they allow courts to undo partisan gerrymanders of the 
kind we face today from North Carolina and Maryland. In giving such 
gerrymanders a pass from judicial review, the majority goes tragically 
wrong.”209 After the majority of the justices in Rucho v. Common 
Cause identified some risks every impartial judge would like to escape, 
the majority simply ignored the fact that for several years now, federal 
courts throughout the nation have developed standards for resolving 
partisan gerrymandering claims.210 The standard for adjudicating par-
tisan gerrymandering claims may appear to be virtually impossible for 
a politicized justice on the Supreme Court who cannot identify with a 
 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id.  
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 2516 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. House-
holder, 373 F. Supp. 3d 978 (S.D. Ohio 2010)); League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Benson, 
373 F. Supp. 3d 867, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2019). 
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concept of electoral fairness that denies the Republican Party its cur-
rent demonstrated partisan gerrymandering benefit advantage. 
 
